President Donald Trump is being pulled toward war in the Middle East by his predator’s eye for a victim’s weakness and his ego’s need to claim the work of others as his own. But since his “unconditional surrender” social-media post on Tuesday, other Trump instincts have asserted themselves: above all, his fear of responsibility.
唐纳德·特朗普（Donald Trump）总统因其捕食者的弱点而被捕食者的眼睛和他的自我要求索取他人自己的工作的必要性被他的捕食者的目光所吸引。但是，自从周二他的“无条件投降”社交媒体帖子以来，其他特朗普的本能已经断言：最重要的是，他对责任的恐惧。
Trump enjoys wielding power. He flinches from accountability. Days ago, Trump seemed to hunger for entry into Israel’s war. A dramatic victory seemed poised to tumble into somebody’s lap. Why not his? But as the hours passed, Trump reconsidered. Instead of acting, he postponed. He said that a decision would come within “two weeks.”
特朗普喜欢挥舞力量。他退缩了问责制。几天前，特朗普似乎渴望参加以色列的战争。一场戏剧性的胜利似乎准备跌入某人的膝盖。为什么不呢？但是随着时间的流逝，特朗普重新考虑了。他没有表演，而是推迟了。他说，一个决定将在“两个星期之内”。
Time for diplomacy to work? Perhaps that might be the case in another administration. In this one, as attentive Trump watchers have learned, the “two weeks” promise is a way of shirking a decision altogether, whether on Russia sanctions (deadline lapsed June 11, without action), trade deals (deadline lapsed June 12, without result), or a much-heralded infrastructure program (deadline lapsed May 20, 2017, without action then or ever).
是时候进行外交工作了吗？也许在另一个政府中可能是这种情况。在这一方面，正如特朗普守望者所学到的那样，“两个星期”的承诺是一种完全推翻决定的方式，无论是在俄罗斯制裁中（6月11日截止日期，没有采取行动），贸易协议，贸易协议（6月12日截止日期，没有结果），还是一项备受责任的基础设施计划（截止日期为5月20日，2017年5月20日，无动作）。
During his first term, Trump claimed to have taken the U.S. to the verge of war with Iran in the summer of 2019, only to cancel the mission (again, by his own account) 10 minutes before mission launch. The story, as Trump told it, can hardly have impressed the rulers of Iran with the U.S. president’s commitment and resolve. But the experience of 2019 could suggest to the Iranian regime a strategy for 2025:
在他的第一个学期中，特朗普声称在2019年夏天将美国带到了与伊朗战争的边缘，但在任务启动前10分钟取消了任务（再次由他自己的帐户）。正如特朗普所说的那样，这个故事几乎不会给伊朗统治者留下深刻的印象。但是2019年的经验可能会向伊朗政权提出2025年战略：
Step 1: Absorb the Israeli strikes, as painful and humiliating as they are. Step 2: Mobilize Russian President Vladimir Putin to dissuade Trump from military action. Step 3: Agree to return to negotiations if Trump forces a cease-fire on Israel. Step 4: Dawdle, obfuscate, and generally play for time. Step 5: Reconstitute whatever remains of the Iranian nuclear program.
步骤1：吸收以色列的罢工，像他们一样痛苦而羞辱。步骤2：动员俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京（Vladimir Putin）劝阻特朗普不受军事行动。步骤3：如果特朗普强迫对以色列的停火，同意返回谈判。步骤4：DAWDLE，混淆，通常在时间上玩。步骤5：重建伊朗核计划的剩余剩余。
This strategy would play on all of Trump’s pressure points, especially his unwillingness to ever do anything that Putin does not want. It would leave Israel in the lurch, but over the years Trump has left many other allies like that.
该策略将在特朗普的所有压力点上发挥作用，尤其是他不愿意做普京不想做的任何事情。这将使以色列陷入困境，但是多年来，特朗普留下了许多其他盟友。
Trump is vulnerable to the negotiate-to-delay strategy because he has not taken any of the necessary steps to lead the nation into the war he once seemed ready to join.
特朗普很容易受到谈判 - 延迟战略的攻击，因为他没有采取任何必要的步骤来带领他曾经准备加入的战争。
Trump has not asked Congress for any kind of authorization. The decision, he insists, will be his and his alone. Which will be feasible if the operation turns out as Ronald Reagan’s invasion of Grenada did in 1983: over in a few days with few U.S. casualties and at minimal cost. But Grenada was a nearby island nation with a population of less than 100,000; Iran is a regional power with a population of more than 90 million.
特朗普没有要求国会任何形式的授权。他坚持认为，这一决定将是他和他的孤独。如果罗纳德·里根（Ronald Reagan）在1983年入侵格林纳达（Ronald Reagan）在1983年的入侵中，这将是可行的：几天后，美国伤亡人数很少，成本很少。但是格林纳达是一个附近的岛国，人口不到100,000。伊朗是人口超过9000万人口的区域大国。
War with Iran will also need real money. The 78-day air war against Serbia in 1998 cost the U.S. and its NATO allies a comparatively modest $7 billion (about $14 billion in today’s dollars). Iran is likely to prove a more dangerous enemy than Serbia was. Israel’s air war against Iran costs about $1 billion a day, according to estimates published by Ynet News. A fight with Iran will likely require some kind of supplemental appropriation above the present defense budget. Congress may balk at funding a costly war it did not approve in the first place.
与伊朗的战争也需要真钱。1998年针对塞尔维亚的78天空战使美国及其北约盟友的薪水相对较小（今天的美元约为140亿美元）。伊朗可能比塞尔维亚更危险的敌人。根据YNET News发布的估计，以色列针对伊朗的空战每天耗资约10亿美元。与伊朗的战斗可能需要以上以高于当前国防预算的补充拨款。国会可能会为一场昂贵的战争提供资金，首先没有批准。
Trump has not put competent leadership in charge of the nation’s defense or domestic security. Trump’s secretary of defense is accused by his own former advisers and friends of playacting a role that completely exceeds his abilities. If Iran retaliates with terror attacks inside the United States or on American interests abroad, it will find the U.S. desperately vulnerable. Trump purged experienced leaders from counterterrorism jobs. He installed underqualified culture warriors atop the FBI, and appointed at the Department of Homeland Security a cosplaying partisan who diverted $200 million of agency resources to a “Thank You Trump” advertising campaign.
特朗普并未将有能力的领导人负责国家的辩护或国内安全。特朗普的国防部长被他自己的前顾问和朋友指控，扮演着一个完全超出他能力的角色。如果伊朗在美国境内或国外利益以恐怖袭击进行报复，它将发现美国迫切容易受到伤害。特朗普从反恐工作中清除了经验丰富的领导人。他在联邦调查局（FBI）的顶部安装了不合格的文化战士，并任命了国土安全部的扮演党派党派，他将2亿美元的代理资源转移到了“谢谢特朗普”广告活动中。
Trump has not mobilized allies other than Israel. The United States has generally fought its major wars alongside coalition partners. Even Trump did so in his first term. France, the United Kingdom, and many other partners shouldered heavy burdens in the 2014–17 campaign in Syria and Iraq against the Islamic State terror group. But Trump did not assemble that coalition; he inherited it from the Obama administration. Trump shows no inclination to try assembling his own in 2025.
特朗普没有动员以色列以外的其他盟友。美国通常与联盟伙伴一起进行了主要战争。甚至特朗普在他的第一个任期内也这样做。法国，英国和许多其他伙伴在2014 - 17年在叙利亚和伊拉克的竞选活动中承担了沉重的负担，这是针对伊斯兰国恐怖组织的。但是特朗普没有组建这个联盟。他从奥巴马政府继承了它。特朗普不愿意在2025年尝试组建自己的倾向。
Trump has not rallied domestic public opinion. Before this year, only a minority of Republicans and not even a third of Democrats regarded Iran as an important security threat to the United States. George W. Bush went to war in Iraq with almost three-quarters of Americans behind him. As late as the spring of 2006, half the country still supported Bush’s war. Trump will begin a war with Iran with less support than Bush could muster after three years in Iraq. Nor does Trump have any evident path to broadening support. As my former Atlantic colleague Ronald Brownstein quips, Trump is governing as a wartime president, but the war into which he has led the country is red America’s culture war against blue America: Even as Trump weighs the deployment of U.S. air power against Iran, he’s leading a federal military occupation of California.
特朗普没有集会国内舆论。在今年之前，只有少数共和党人，甚至没有三分之一的民主党人将伊朗视为对美国的重要安全威胁。乔治·W·布什（George W. Bush）在伊拉克（Iraq）与他身后的几乎四分之三的美国人一起参加了战争。直到2006年春天，该国一半仍然支持布什的战争。特朗普将在伊拉克三年后与布什召集的支持少于伊朗的战争。特朗普也没有任何明显的扩大支持途径。当我的前大西洋同事罗纳德·布朗斯坦（Ronald Brownstein）打趣时，特朗普正在担任战时总统，但他领导的战争是红美国对蓝色美国的文化战争：即使特朗普权衡了美国对伊朗的部署，他领导着联邦军事占领加利福尼亚。
Trump seems to recognize that he cannot unify the nation and therefore dares not lead it into any arduous or hazardous undertaking. That may be the secret self-awareness behind Trump’s “two weeks” hesitation. This is not a self-awareness that will help Israel or secure the United States’ long-term interest in depriving Iran of a nuclear weapon. But in the absence of any strategic planning or preparedness, that self-awareness is all we have to guide the country through the next fortnight and, very possibly, a long succession of “two weeks” after that.
特朗普似乎认识到他不能统一国家，因此不敢将其带入任何艰巨或危险的事业。这可能是特朗普“两周”犹豫背后的秘密自我意识。这不是一种自我意识，它将帮助以色列或确保美国在剥夺伊朗的核武器方面的长期利益。但是，在没有任何战略规划或准备的情况下，我们必须全部指导该国在接下来的两周内，而且很可能是“两个星期”的长期连续。
Illustration Sources: Iranian Leader Press Office / Handout/ Anadolu / Getty; Brendan Smialowski / AFP; Getty.
插图资料来源：伊朗领导人新闻办公室 /讲义 / Anadolu / Getty；Brendan Smialowski / AFP;盖蒂。
