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In the summer of 1974, Richard Nixon was under great strain and drinking too much. During a White House meeting with two members of Congress, he argued that impeaching a president because of “a little burglary” at the Democrats’ campaign headquarters was ridiculous. “I can go in my office and pick up the telephone, and in 25 minutes, millions of people will be dead,” Nixon said, according to one congressman, Charles Rose of North Carolina.
1974年夏天，理查德·尼克松（Richard Nixon）受到了很大的压力，饮酒过多。在与两名国会议员的白宫会议上，他辩称，由于民主党竞选总部的“小盗窃”，弹each总统是荒谬的。尼克松说：“我可以去办公室接电话，在25分钟内，数以百万计的人将死亡。”
The 37th president was likely trying to convey the immense burden of the presidency, not issue a direct threat, but he had already made perceived irrationality—his “madman theory”—part of U.S. foreign policy. He had deployed B-52s armed with nuclear bombs over the Arctic to spook the Soviets. He had urged Henry Kissinger, his national security adviser, to “think big” by considering nuclear targets in Vietnam. Then, as his presidency disintegrated, Nixon sank into an angry paranoia. Yet until the moment he resigned, nuclear “command and control”—the complex but delicate system that allows a president to launch weapons that could wipe out cities and kill billions of people—remained in Nixon’s restless hands alone, just as it had for his four post–World War II predecessors, and would for his successors.
第37任总统可能试图传达总统职位的巨大负担，而不是发出直接威胁，但他已经使人们认为非理性（他的“疯子理论”）是美国外交政策的部分。他曾在北极部署武装核弹的B-52，以吓到苏联。他敦促他的国家安全顾问亨利·基辛格（Henry Kissinger）通过考虑越南的核目标来“思考大”。然后，当他的总统任期瓦解时，尼克松沉入了愤怒的偏执狂。然而，直到他辞职的那一刻，核“指挥和控制”（这是一个复杂但精致的系统，允许总统发射可以消灭城市并杀死数十亿人的武器 - 独自一人在尼克松的不安之手中被遗忘，就像他的四次 - 世界后第二次世界大战的前辈那样，并将为他的继任者。
For 80 years, the president of the United States has remained the sole authority who can order the use of American nuclear weapons. If the commander in chief wishes to launch a sudden, unprovoked strike, or escalate a conventional conflict, or retaliate against a single nuclear aggression with all-out nuclear war, the choice is his and his alone. The order cannot be countermanded by anyone in the government or the military. His power is so absolute that nuclear arms for decades have been referred to in the defense community as “the president’s weapon.”
80年来，美国总统一直是唯一可以命令使用美国核武器的权力。如果总司令希望发动突然，无端的罢工，或升级常规冲突，或者以全面的核战争对单一的核侵略进行报复，那么选择就是他和他的独自一人。政府或军方中的任何人都不能反合该命令。他的权力是如此绝对，以至于在国防界将核武器数十年称为“总统的武器”。
Nearly every president has had moments of personal instability and perhaps impaired judgment, however brief. Dwight Eisenhower was hospitalized for a heart attack, which triggered a national debate over his fitness for office and reelection. John F. Kennedy was secretly taking powerful drugs for Addison’s disease, whose symptoms can include extreme fatigue and erratic moods. Ronald Reagan and Joe Biden, in their later years, wrestled with the debilitations of advanced age. And at this very moment, a small plastic card of top-secret codes—the president’s personal key to America’s nuclear arsenal—is resting in one of President Donald Trump’s pockets as he fixates on shows of dominance, fumes about enemies (real and perceived), and allows misinformation to sway his decision making—all while regional wars simmer around the world.
几乎每位总统都有个人不稳定的时刻，也许是判断力受损，无论多么简短。德怀特·艾森豪威尔（Dwight Eisenhower）因心脏病发作而住院，这引发了关于他的任职和连任的全国性辩论。约翰·肯尼迪（John F. Kennedy）秘密服用强大的药物来治疗艾迪生氏病，其症状可能包括极端的疲劳和不稳定的情绪。罗纳德·里根（Ronald Reagan）和乔·拜登（Joe Biden）在后来的几年中，与高年龄的衰弱搏斗。此时此刻，一张小型秘密代码的小塑料卡（总统的个人核心武器库的个人钥匙）放在唐纳德·特朗普总统的一个口袋里，因为他固定在统治地位，关于敌人（真实和感知到的敌人的烟雾）上，并允许误解了他的决策，以挥舞着他的决策 - 在世界各地围绕世界各地的战争。
For nearly 30 years after the Cold War, fears of nuclear war seemed to recede. Then relations with Russia froze over and Trump entered politics. Voters handed him the nuclear codes—not once, but twice—even though he has spoken about unleashing “fire and fury” against another nuclear power, and reportedly called for a nearly tenfold increase in the American arsenal after previously asking an adviser why the United States had nuclear weapons if it couldn’t use them. The Russians have repeatedly made noise about going nuclear in their war against Ukraine, on the border of four NATO allies. India and Pakistan, both nuclear powers, renewed violent skirmishes over Kashmir in May. North Korea plans to improve and expand its nuclear forces, which would threaten U.S. cities and further agitate South Korea, where some leaders are debating whether to develop the bomb for themselves. And in June, Israel and the United States launched attacks against Iran after Israel announced its determination to end—once and for all—Iran’s nascent nuclear threat to its existence.
冷战近30年来，人们对核战争的恐惧似乎消失了。然后与俄罗斯的关系冻结，特朗普进入了政治。选民向他递给他核法规，而不是一次，而是两次，尽管他谈到了对另一项核电的“火与愤怒”释放，据报道，在以前询问顾问为何不使用核武器的顾问之后，美国阿森纳呼吁增加美国阿森纳的十倍。俄罗斯人一再对在北约四个盟友边界对乌克兰的战争中进行核战争发出噪音。印度和巴基斯坦都是核大国，于5月对克什米尔进行了暴力冲突。朝鲜计划改善和扩大其核力量，这将威胁到美国的城市并进一步煽动韩国，一些领导人正在辩论是否要自己开发炸弹。6月，以色列和美国在以色列宣布决心结束伊朗和所有人对伊朗对其存在的新生核威胁的决心发动袭击。
If any of these conflicts erupts, the nuclear option rests on command and control, which hinges on the authority—and humanity—of the president. This has been the system since the end of World War II. Does it still make sense today?
如果这些冲突中的任何一个爆发，核方案就取决于指挥和控制，这取决于总统的权威和人类。自第二次世界大战结束以来，这就是系统。今天仍然有意义吗？
Here’s how the end of the world could begin. Whether the president is directing a first strike on an enemy, or responding to an attack on the United States or its allies, the process is the same: He would first confer with his top civilian and military advisers. If he reached a decision to order the use of nuclear weapons, the president would call for “the football,” a leather-bound aluminum case that weighs about 45 pounds. It is carried by a military aide who is never far from the commander in chief no matter where he goes; in many photos of presidents traveling, you can see the aide carrying the case in the background.
这是世界末日的开始。无论总统是针对敌人进行首次罢工，还是对对美国或其盟友的袭击做出反应，这一过程都是相同的：他将首先与他的顶级平民和军事顾问交流。如果他决定下令使用核武器，总统将呼吁“足球”，这是一个皮革结合的铝制案例，重约45磅。它是由一名军事助手携带的，无论他走到哪里，他都不远离总司令。在许多旅行总统的照片中，您可以看到背景中携带案件的助手。
There is no nuclear “button” inside this case, or any other way for the president to personally launch weapons. It is a communications device, meant to quickly and reliably link the commander in chief to the Pentagon. It also contains attack options, laid out on laminated plastic sheets. (These look like a Denny’s menu, according to those who have seen them.) The options are broadly divided by the size of the strikes. The target sets are classified, but those who work with nuclear weapons have long joked that they could be categorized as “Rare,” “Medium,” and “Well-Done.”
此案内部没有核“按钮”，也没有任何其他方式让总统亲自发射武器。它是一种通信设备，旨在快速可靠地将指挥官与五角大楼联系起来。它还包含攻击选项，并在层压塑料板上布置。（根据那些看过它们的人的说法，这些看起来像丹尼的菜单。）这些选项大致除以罢工的大小。目标集是分类的，但是那些使用核武器工作的人长期以来开玩笑说他们可以被归类为“稀有”，“中等”和“做得好”。
Read: Why do people refer to a nonexistent ‘nuclear button’?
阅读：人们为什么指的是不存在的“核按钮”？
Once the president has made his choices, the football connects him to an officer in the Pentagon, who would immediately issue a challenge code using the military phonetic alphabet, such as “Tango Delta.” To verify the order, the president must read the corresponding code from the plastic card (nicknamed “the biscuit”) in his pocket. He needs no other permission; however, another official in the room, likely the secretary of defense, must affirm that the person who used the code is, in fact, the president.
总统做出选择后，足球将他与五角大楼的一名军官联系起来，五角大楼将立即使用军事语音字母发布挑战代码，例如“ Tango Delta”。为了验证该命令，总统必须在口袋里阅读塑料卡（昵称为“饼干”）的相应代码。他不需要其他许可；但是，房间中的另一位官员，可能是国防部长，必须确认使用该法规的人实际上是总统。
The Pentagon command center would then, within two minutes, issue specific mission orders to the nuclear units of the Air Force and Navy. Men and women in launch centers deep underground in the Great Plains—or in the cockpits of bombers on runways in North Dakota and Louisiana, or aboard submarines lurking in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans—would receive target packages, codes, and orders to proceed with the use of their nuclear weapons.
然后，五角大楼指挥中心将在两分钟内向空军和海军的核部门下达特定的任务命令。在大平原的地下中心的男性和女人（在北达科他州和路易斯安那州的跑道上的轰炸机的驾驶舱中，或潜伏在大西洋和太平洋的潜艇上的驾驶舱中）将收到目标包装，代码和命令，以继续使用核武器。
If enemy missiles are inbound, this process would be crammed into a matter of minutes, or seconds. Nuclear weapons launched from Russian submarines in the Atlantic could hit the White House only seven or eight minutes after a launch is detected. Confirmation of the launch could take five to seven minutes, as officials scramble to rule out a technical error.
如果敌人的导弹是入站的，则此过程将被挤入几分钟或几秒钟的问题。从大西洋俄罗斯潜艇发射的核武器可能在发现发射后仅七或八分钟就可以袭击白宫。确认发布可能需要五到七分钟，因为官员争先恐后排除技术错误。
Errors have happened, multiple times, in both the United States and Russia. In June 1980, President Jimmy Carter’s national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, received a call from his military aide in the middle of the night, according to Edward Luce’s new biography of Brzezinski. The aide told Brzezinski that hundreds—no, thousands—of Soviet missiles were inbound, and he should prepare to wake the president. As he waited for the military to confirm the attack, Brzezinski decided not to wake his wife, thinking that she was better off dying in her sleep than knowing what was about to happen.
在美国和俄罗斯，多次发生了错误。1980年6月，吉米·卡特（Jimmy Carter）总统的国家安全顾问Zbigniew Brzezinski在半夜接到了他的军队助手的电话，爱德华·卢斯（Edward Luce）的新传记布尔津斯基（Brzezinski）表示。助手告诉Brzezinski，苏联导弹的数百名没有数百人入站，他应该准备唤醒总统。当他等待军队确认袭击时，布尔津斯基决定不唤醒他的妻子，以为自己在睡眠中比知道即将发生的事情要好。
The aide called back. False alarm. Someone had accidentally fed a training simulation into the NORAD computers.
助手回叫。虚惊。有人意外地将培训模拟送入了NORAD计算机。
In an actual attack, there would be almost no time for deliberation. There would be time only for the president to have confidence in the system, and make a snap decision about the fate of the Earth.
在实际攻击中，几乎没有时间进行审议。总统只有时间才能对该制度充满信心，并对地球的命运做出决定。
The destruction of Hiroshima changed the character of war. Battles might still be fought with conventional bombs and artillery, but now whole nations could be wiped out suddenly by nuclear weapons. World leaders intuited that nuclear weapons were not just another tool to be wielded by military commanders. As British Prime Minister Winston Churchill said to U.S. Secretary of War Henry Stimson in 1945: “What was gunpowder? Trivial. What was electricity? Meaningless. This atomic bomb is the Second Coming in Wrath.”
广岛的破坏改变了战争的特征。传统炸弹和炮兵可能仍会进行战斗，但现在核武器可以突然消灭整个国家。世界领导人直觉，核武器不仅是军事指挥官挥舞的另一种工具。正如英国首相温斯顿·丘吉尔（Winston Churchill）在1945年对美国战争部长亨利·斯蒂姆森（Henry Stimson）所说的那样：“火药是什么？琐碎。电力是什么？毫无意义。这第二枚原子弹是愤怒的第二枚。”
Harry Truman agreed. He never doubted the need to use atomic bombs against Japan, but he moved quickly to take control of these weapons from the military. The day after the bombing of Nagasaki, Truman declared that no other nuclear bombs be used without his direct orders—a change from his permissive “noninterference” in atomic matters until that point, as Major General Leslie Groves, the head of the Manhattan Project, later described it. As a third bomb was readied for use against Japan, Truman established direct, personal control over the arsenal. Truman didn’t like the idea of killing “all those kids,” Secretary of Commerce Henry Wallace wrote in his diary on August 10, 1945, adding that the president believed that “wiping out another 100,000 people was too horrible” to contemplate.
哈里·杜鲁门（Harry Truman）同意。他从不怀疑需要对日本使用原子炸弹，但他迅速采取行动以控制军队的这些武器。长崎轰炸后的第二天，杜鲁门宣布没有他的直接命令没有使用其他核弹，这与他在原子问题上的宽容“非干预”发生了变化，直到那时，正如曼哈顿项目负责人莱斯利·格罗夫斯（Leslie Groves）少将，后来又描述了这一点。当第三枚炸弹被准备对日本使用时，杜鲁门建立了对阿森纳的直接个人控制。杜鲁门（Truman）不喜欢杀死“所有这些孩子”的想法，亨利·华莱士（Henry Wallace）在1945年8月10日的日记中写道，他补充说，总统认为“擦掉另外100,000人太可怕了”，无法考虑。
In 1946, Truman signed the Atomic Energy Act, placing the development and manufacture of nuclear weapons firmly under civilian control. Two years later, a then-top-secret National Security Council document stated clearly who was in charge: “The decision as to the employment of atomic weapons in the event of war is to be made by the Chief Executive.”
1946年，杜鲁门（Truman）签署了《原子能法》，将核武器的开发和制造牢固地置于平民控制之下。两年后，当时的秘密国家安全委员会的一份文件清楚地指出了谁是负责人：“在战争时就雇用原子武器的决定是由首席执行官做出的。”
Military eagerness to use atomic weapons was not an idle concern. When the Soviet Union tested its first atomic bomb, in 1949, some military officials urged Truman to act first and destroy the Soviet nuclear program. “We’re at war, damn it!” Major General Orvil Anderson said. “Give me the order to do it, and I can break up Russia’s five A-bomb nests in a week! And when I went up to Christ, I think I could explain to him why I wanted to do it—now—before it’s too late. I think I could explain to him that I had saved civilization!” The Air Force quickly relieved Anderson, but the general wasn’t alone. Influential voices in American political, intellectual, and military circles were in favor of preventive nuclear attack against the Soviet Union. But only the president’s voice mattered.
军事渴望使用原子武器并不是一个闲置的问题。1949年，当苏联测试其第一枚原子弹时，一些军事官员敦促杜鲁门首先采取行动并摧毁苏联核计划。“我们在战争，该死！”奥维尔·安德森少将说。“给我一个命令，我可以在一周内分解俄罗斯的五个炸弹巢！当我去基督上时，我想我可以向他解释为什么我想这样做 - 现在 - 现在太晚了。我想我可以向他解释我已经拯救了文明！”空军迅速解除了安德森，但将军并不孤单。美国政治，知识分子和军事圈子中有影响力的声音赞成对苏联的预防核攻击。但是只有总统的声音很重要。
Truman took power over the bomb to limit its use. But as command and control morphed to accommodate more advanced weapons and the rising Soviet threat, the president needed to be able to order a variety of nuclear strikes against a variety of targets. And he could launch any of them without so much as a courtesy call to Congress (let alone waiting for its declaration of war). Should he want to, the president could, in effect, go to war by himself, with his weapon.
杜鲁门（Truman）对炸弹掌权以限制其使用。但是，随着指挥和控制能够适应更先进的武器和苏联崛起的威胁，总统需要能够对各种目标下令进行各种核罢工。他可以在没有太多的礼节呼吁国会（更不用说等待其战争宣言）的情况下发射任何一个。总统实际上可以用他的武器独自发动战争。
In the early 1950s, the United States created a primitive nuclear strategy, aimed at containing the Soviet Union. America and its allies couldn’t be everywhere at once, but they could make the Kremlin pay the ultimate price for almost any kind of mischief in the world, not just a nuclear attack on the United States. This idea was called “massive retaliation”: a promise to use America’s “great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means and at places of our choosing,” in the words of Eisenhower’s secretary of state, John Foster Dulles.
在1950年代初期，美国制定了一项原始的核战略，旨在包含苏联。美国及其盟友不可能一次到处都是，但是他们可以使克里姆林宫几乎为世界上任何一种恶作剧而不仅仅是对美国的核袭击，以付出最终的代价。这个想法被称为“大规模报复”：用艾森豪威尔国务卿约翰·福斯特·杜勒斯（John Foster Dulles）的话说，可以利用美国“立即和选择我们选择的伟大报复能力进行报复的能力”。
When the Soviets launched Sputnik into space in October 1957, Eisenhower’s approval rating had already been dropping for months, and he signed off on a major arms buildup, allowing for more targets—even though he remained deeply skeptical about the utility of nuclear weapons. “You can’t have this kind of war,” he said at a White House meeting a month after Sputnik. “There just aren’t enough bulldozers to scrape the bodies off the streets.”
1957年10月，当苏联人在太空中推出了Sputnik时，艾森豪威尔的批准率已经下降了几个月，他签署了一个主要的武器堆积，允许更多目标，即使他对核武器的实用性仍然非常怀疑。“你不能遇到这种战争，”他在人造卫星的一次白宫会议上说。“只是没有足够的推土机可以将尸体从街上刮掉。”
Ike’s successors would likewise remain suspicious of the nuclear option, even as the U.S. military relied on their willingness to invest in it. And the system was getting trickier to manage: As the power of the arsenal increased, so did the possibilities for misunderstanding and miscalculation.
艾克的继任者同样会对核选择保持怀疑，即使美国军方依靠他们愿意投资于核方案。而且该系统越来越棘手：随着阿森纳的力量的增加，误解和错误估计的可能性也随之增加。
In 1959, the bomber era gave way to the missile era, which likewise complicated nuclear decision making. Intercontinental ballistic missiles streaking around the globe at many times the speed of sound were more frightening than Soviet bombers sneaking over the Arctic. Suddenly, the president’s window to make grave decisions shrank from hours to minutes, rendering broader deliberations impossible and bolstering the need for only one person to have nuclear authority.
1959年，轰炸机时代让位于导弹时代，这同样使核决策复杂化。多次，声音的速度比苏联轰炸机在北极偷偷摸摸的速度更令人恐惧。突然，总统做出严重决定的窗口从几个小时到几分钟缩小，使更广泛的审议不可能，并加强了只有一个人拥有核权威的需求。
At about the same time, the Soviets were surrounding U.S., French, and British forces in Berlin, putting East and West in direct confrontation—making nuclear war more likely, and compounding the strain on the president. If the West refused to back down in any provincial conflict elsewhere in the world, the Soviets could move into West Germany, betting that doing so would collapse NATO and make Washington capitulate. The Americans, in turn, were betting that the threat (or use) of nuclear weapons would prevent (or halt) such an invasion.
大约同时，苏联人在柏林的美国，法国和英军周围，使东方和西部的直接对抗 - 更有可能使核战争加剧总统的压力。如果西方拒绝在世界其他地方的任何省级冲突中退缩，苏维埃可以搬进西德，下注，这样做会倒塌并使华盛顿屈服。反过来，美国人敢打赌，核武器的威胁（或使用）将阻止（或停止）这种入侵。
But if either side crossed the nuclear threshold on the European battlefield, the game would soon come down to: Which superpower is going to launch an all-out attack on the other’s homeland first, and when?
但是，如果任何一方都越过欧洲战场上的核门槛，那么比赛很快就会降到：哪个超级大国将首先对对方的家园进行全面攻击，什么时候？
In such nuclear brinkmanship, every decision made by the president could spark a catastrophe. If he stayed in Washington, he would risk being killed. If he evacuated the White House, the Soviets could take it as a sign that the Americans were readying a strike—which in turn could provoke their fears, and move them to strike first. In the midst of this frenzy, billions of lives and the future of civilization would depend on the perceptions and emotions of the American president and his opponents in the Kremlin.
在这样的核边缘，总统做出的每一个决定都可能引发灾难。如果他留在华盛顿，他可能会被杀害。如果他撤离了白宫，苏联人可以将其视为美国人准备罢工的标志 - 反过来可能会引起他们的恐惧，并将他们首先罢工。在这一疯狂的过程中，数十亿人的生命和文明的未来将取决于美国总统及其对手在克里姆林宫的看法和情感。
Presidents decide, but planners plan, and what planners do is find targets for ordnance. In late 1960, just before Kennedy entered the White House, the U.S. military developed its first set of options meant to coordinate all nuclear forces in the event of a nuclear war. It was called the Single Integrated Operational Plan, or SIOP, but it wasn’t much of a plan.
总统决定，但是计划者计划以及计划者的工作是找到军械的目标。1960年末，就在肯尼迪进入白宫之前，美国军方开发了其第一组选择，旨在在核战争中协调所有核力量。它被称为单一集成的操作计划或SIOP，但这并不是一件计划。
The 1961 SIOP envisioned throwing everything in the U.S. arsenal not only at the Soviet Union but at China as well, even if it wasn’t involved in the conflict. This was not an option so much as an order to kill at least 400 million people, no matter how the war began. Kennedy was told bluntly (and correctly) by his military advisers that even after such a gargantuan strike, some portion of the Soviet arsenal was nonetheless certain to survive—and inflict horrifying damage on North America. Mutual assured destruction, as it would soon be called. At a briefing on the SIOP hosted by General Thomas Power, a voice of reason spoke up, according to a defense official, John Rubel:
1961年的SIOP设想，不仅在苏联，而且在中国也将所有东西都扔给了美国阿森纳，即使它不参与冲突。无论战争是如何开始的，这都不是一种选择，而是杀死至少4亿人的命令。他的军事顾问直言不讳地告诉肯尼迪，即使经过如此巨大的罢工，苏联阿森纳的某些部分仍然可以生存，并且对北美造成了恐怖的破坏。相互保证的破坏，很快就会被称为。一位辩护官员约翰·鲁贝尔（John Rubel）说，在由托马斯·鲍尔（Thomas Power）主持的SIOP的简报中，理性的声音说话：约翰·鲁贝尔（John Rubel）：
“What if this isn’t China’s war?” the voice asked. “What if this is just a war with the Soviets? Can you change the plan?”
“如果这不是中国战争怎么办？”声音问。“如果这只是与苏联的战争怎么办？您能更改计划吗？”
“Well, yeah,” said General Power resignedly, “we can, but I hope nobody thinks of it, because it would really screw up the plan.”
“嗯，是的，”一般权力辞职说，“我们可以，但我希望没人能想到，因为这确实会搞砸计划。”
Power added: “I just hope none of you have any relatives in Albania,” because the plan also included nuking a Soviet installation in the tiny Communist nation. The commandant of the Marine Corps, General David Shoup, was among those disgusted by the plan, saying that it was “not the American way,” and Rubel would later write that he felt like he was witnessing Nazi officials coordinating mass extermination.
Power补充说：“我只是希望你们中没有人在阿尔巴尼亚有任何亲戚”，因为该计划还包括在这个小型共产主义国家制定苏联装置。海军陆战队的指挥官戴维·舒普将军（David Shoup）将军是对该计划感到厌恶的人，称这不是“美国方式”，鲁贝尔后来写道，他觉得自己正在目睹纳粹官员协调大规模灭绝。
Mike McQuade; Sovfoto / Universal Images Group / Getty; Bettmann / Getty; Corbis / Getty; Michel Artault / Gamma-Rapho / Getty
迈克·麦克奎德（Mike McQuade）；Sovfoto / Universal Images组 / Getty;贝特曼 /盖蒂；Corbis / Getty;Michel Artault / Gamma-Rapho / Getty
Every president since Eisenhower has been aghast at his nuclear options. Even Nixon was shocked by the level of casualties envisioned by the latest SIOP. In 1974, he ordered the Pentagon to develop options for the “limited” use of nuclear weapons. When Kissinger asked for a plan to stop a notional Soviet invasion of Iran, the military suggested using nearly 200 nuclear bombs along the Soviet-Iranian border. “Are you out of your minds?” Kissinger screamed during a meeting. “This is a limited option?”
自艾森豪威尔以来，每位总统都对他的核选择感到震惊。甚至尼克松也对最新SIOP所设想的伤亡水平感到震惊。1974年，他命令五角大楼开发“有限”使用核武器的选择。当基辛格要求制定一项计划以制止苏联对伊朗的入侵时，军方建议在苏联 - 伊朗边境沿线使用近200枚核弹。“你不在心中吗？”基辛格在一次会议上尖叫。“这是一个有限的选择？”
In late 1983, Ronald Reagan received a briefing on the latest SIOP, and he wrote in his memoir that “there were still some people at the Pentagon who claimed a nuclear war was ‘winnable.’ I thought they were crazy.” The Reagan adviser Paul Nitze, shortly before his death, told a fellow ambassador: “You know, I advised Reagan that we should never use nuclear weapons. In fact, I told him that they should not be used even, and especially, in retaliation.”
1983年下半年，罗纳德·里根（Ronald Reagan）收到了有关最新SIOP的简报，他在回忆录中写道：“五角大楼仍然有一些人声称核战争是'可赢得的。’我认为他们很疯狂。”里根顾问保罗·尼特兹（Paul Nitze）在他去世前不久告诉同胞大使：“你知道，我建议里根不要使用核武器。实际上，我告诉他，甚至不应使用它们，尤其是在报复中。”
By the end of the Cold War, the system—though commanded by the president—had metastasized into something nearly uncontrollable: a highly technical cataclysm generator, built to turn unthinkable options into devastating actions. Every president was boxed in: a single command, basically, and very little control. In 1991, George H. W. Bush began to hack away at the overgrown system by presiding over major cuts in American weapons and the number of nuclear targets. But presidents come and go, and war planners remain: The military increased the target list by 20 percent in the years after Bush left office.
到冷战结束时，该系统（尽管总统指挥）已经转移到了几乎无法控制的东西：高度技术性的灾难发电机，旨在将不可思议的选择变成毁灭性的行动。每位总统都被装箱了：基本上是一个命令，几乎没有控制力。1991年，乔治·H·W·布什（George H. W. Bush）主持了美国武器的重大削减和核目标的数量，开始在杂草丛生的系统中攻击。但是总统来来去去，战争计划者仍然存在：在布什离开办公室后的几年中，军方将目标名单增加了20％。
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has undertaken some meaningful reforms, including negotiating major reductions in U.S. and Russian nuclear inventories, and creating more safeguards against technical failures. In the ’90s, for example, American ballistic missiles were targeted at the open ocean, in case of accidental launch. If a nuclear crisis erupts, though, the president will still be presented with plans and options that he didn’t design or even desire.
自冷战结束以来，美国已经进行了一些有意义的改革，包括谈判美国和俄罗斯核库存的重大减少，以及为技术失败提供更多保障措施。例如，在90年代，如果意外发射，美国弹道导弹的目标是公开海洋。但是，如果核危机爆发，总统仍然会出现他没有设计甚至渴望的计划和选择。
In 2003, the SIOP was replaced by a modern operations plan (OPLAN) that ostensibly gives the president more options than the extinction of humanity, including delayed responses rather than instant retaliation. But that initial OPLAN also reportedly included options to devastate small, nonnuclear nations, and although the details are secret, military exercises and unclassified documents over the past 20 years indicate that modern nuclear plans largely seem imported from the previous century.
在2003年，SIOP被现代运营计划（OPLAN）取代，表面上比人类的灭绝，包括延迟的反应而不是即时报复。但是据报道，最初的Oplan还包括摧毁小型无核国家的选择，尽管细节是秘密，但在过去的20年中，军事演习和未分类的文件表明，现代核计划似乎从上个世纪起很大程度上是进口的。
The concentration of power in the presidency, the compression of his decision timeline, and the methodical targeting done by military planners have all conspired, over 80 years, to produce a system that carries great and unnecessary risks—and still leaves the president free to order a nuclear strike for any reason he sees fit. There are ways, though, to reduce that risk without undermining the basic strategy of nuclear deterrence.
总统任期内的权力集中，他的决策时间表的压缩以及军事计划人员所做的有条不紊的目标，全都串通了80年以上，以产生一个带有巨大和不必要的风险的制度，并且仍然让总统自由地出于任何理由而自由地命令核罢工。但是，有一些方法可以降低这种风险，而不会破坏核威慑的基本策略。
The first thing the United States could do—to limit an impetuous president, and reduce the likelihood of doomsday—is commit to a policy of “no first use” of nuclear weapons. A law to prohibit a first strike without congressional approval was reintroduced in the House of Representatives earlier this year, though it is unlikely to pass. Absent congressional action, any president could commit to no first use by executive order, which might create breathing room during a crisis (if adversaries believe him, that is).
美国可以做的第一件事 - 限制浮躁的总统并减少世界末日的可能性 - 致力于“不首次使用”核武器的政策。今年早些时候，在众议院重新引入了禁止未经国会批准的第一次罢工的法律，尽管这不太可能通过。没有国会行动，任何总统都可能不首次使用行政命令，这可能会在危机期间造成呼吸空间（如果对手相信他，那就是）。
And every president should insist that the options available in the face of an incoming strike include more limited retaliatory strikes, and fewer all-out responses. In other words: Delete the items we don’t need from the Denny’s menu, and reduce the existing portions. America may need only a few hundred deployed strategic warheads—rather than the current 1,500 or so—to maintain deterrence. Even at that lower number, no nation has enough firepower to strip away all American retaliatory capabilities with a first strike. A president who orders a reduction in the number of deployed warheads, while still holding key targets at risk, would wrest back some control over the system, just as a functioning Congress could pass legislation to limit the president’s nuclear options. The world would be safer.
每个总统都应坚持认为，面对即将来临的罢工时可用的选择包括更多有限的报复性罢工和更少的全力以赴。换句话说：从丹尼的菜单中删除我们不需要的项目，并减少现有部分。美国可能只需要几百个战略弹头即可维护威慑力。即使以较低的数字，也没有一个国家有足够的火力来剥夺所有美国报复能力。一名总统下令减少部署的弹头数量，同时仍将关键目标保持在危险中，这将夺回对系统的某些控制权，就像国会正常的国会可以通过立法以限制总统的核选择一样。世界会更安全。
Of course, none of this solves the fundamental nuclear dilemma: Human survival depends on an imperfect system working perfectly. Command and control relies on technology that must always function and heads that must always stay cool. Some defense analysts wonder if AI—which reacts faster and more dispassionately to information than human beings—could alleviate some of the burden of nuclear decision making. This is a spectacularly dangerous idea. AI might be helpful in rapidly sorting data, and in distinguishing a real attack from an error, but it is not infallible. The president doesn’t need instantaneous decisions from an algorithm.
当然，这都没有解决基本的核难题：人类的生存取决于完美工作的不完美系统。命令和控制依赖于必须始终发挥作用的技术，并且必须始终保持冷静。一些国防分析师想知道，与人类相比，对信息的反应（对信息的反应更快，对信息都更加冷静）是否会减轻一些核决策的负担。这是一个非常危险的想法。AI可能有助于快速分类数据，并将实际攻击与错误区分开来，但并不可靠。总统不需要算法即时决定。
From the June 2023 issue: Ross Andersen on artificial intelligence and the nuclear codes
从2023年6月的发行开始：罗斯·安德森（Ross Andersen）关于人工智能和核法规
Vesting sole authority in the president is perhaps the least worst option when it comes to deterring a major attack. In a time crunch, groupthink can be as dangerous as the frenzied judgment of one person, and retaliatory orders must remain the president’s decision—above any bureaucracy, and separate from the military and its war games. The choice to strike first, however, should be a political debate. The president should not have the option to start a nuclear war by himself.
在阻止重大攻击方面，总统赋予唯一的权威也许是最糟糕的选择。在时间紧缩的情况下，集体思维可能与一个人的疯狂判断一样危险，而报复性命令必须仍然是总统的决定 - 放弃任何官僚机构，并与军队及其战争游戏分开。但是，首先罢工的选择应该是一场政治辩论。总统不应选择自己发动核战争。
But what happens when a president with poor judgment or few morals arrives in the White House, or when a president deteriorates in office? Today, the only immediate checks on a reckless president are the human beings in the chain of command, who would have to choose to abdicate their duties in order to stall or thwart an order they found reprehensible or insane. Members of the military, however, are trained to obey and execute; mutiny is not a fail-safe device. The president could fire and replace anyone who impedes the process. And U.S. service members should never be put in a position to stop orders that defy reason; gaming out such a scenario is corrosive to national security and American democracy itself.
但是，当判断力不佳或道德差的总统到达白宫时，或者总统在任职时发生罪行时会发生什么？如今，对鲁ck总统的唯一立即检查是指挥连锁店中的人类，他们必须选择退位，以便拖延或阻止他们发现应受到谴责或疯狂的命令。但是，军事成员接受了服从和处决的训练。Mutiny不是故障安全设备。总统可以开火并取代任何阻碍该过程的人。不应将美国服务成员置于停止违反理由的命令；游戏场景对国家安全和美国民主本身具有腐蚀性。
When I asked a former Air Force missile-squadron commander if senior officers could refuse the order to launch nuclear weapons, he said: “We were told we can refuse illegal and immoral orders.” He paused. “But no one ever told us what immoral means.”
当我问一名前空军导弹 - Quadron指挥官时，高级官员是否可以拒绝发射核武器的命令时说：“我们被告知我们可以拒绝非法和不道德的命令。”他停了下来。“但是没有人告诉我们不道德的含义。”
In the end, the American voters are a kind of fail-safe themselves. They decide who sits at the top of the system of command and control. When they walk into a voting booth, they should of course think about health care, the price of eggs, and how much it costs to fill their gas tank. But they must also remember that they are in fact putting the nuclear codes in the pocket of one person. Voters must elect presidents who can think clearly in a crisis and broadly about long-term strategy. They must elevate leaders of sound judgment and strong character.
最后，美国选民本身就是一种故障安全。他们决定谁位于指挥和控制系统的顶部。当他们走进一个投票摊位时，他们当然应该考虑医疗保健，鸡蛋的价格以及装满汽油箱的成本。但是他们还必须记住，实际上他们正在将核法规放在一个人的口袋里。选民必须选举总统，他们在危机中可以清楚地思考以及对长期战略的广泛思考。他们必须提升良好的判断力和强大品格的领导者。
The president’s most important job, as the sole steward of America’s nuclear arsenal, is to prevent nuclear war. And a voter’s most important job is to choose the right person for that responsibility.
作为美国核武库的唯一管理者，总统最重要的工作是防止核战争。选民最重要的工作是为这一责任选择合适的人。
