Last night, President Donald Trump announced a “total and complete” cease-fire between Israel and Iran. Iran’s nuclear program, Trump said, had been “obliterated” and “totally destroyed” by the U.S. strikes, and Iran’s retaliation was “very weak” and resulted in “hardly any damage.”
昨晚，唐纳德·特朗普（Donald Trump）总统宣布以色列和伊朗之间的“完全和完整”停火。特朗普说，伊朗的核计划已被美国的罢工“毁灭”，“完全摧毁”，伊朗的报复“非常薄弱”，导致“几乎没有任何损害”。
If the cease-fire holds, this episode would appear to mark a major foreign-policy victory for the president. But Trump may have made a crucial mistake that could bring about the very outcome that successive American presidents have sought to prevent: an Iranian nuclear weapon.
如果停火成立，这一集将标志着总统的重大外国政策胜利。但是特朗普可能犯了一个关键的错误，这可能会带来连续美国总统试图预防的结果：伊朗核武器。
The problem is that the cease-fire is not linked to a diplomatic agreement with Iran on the future of its nuclear program. Trump apparently sees no need for further negotiation, because the military strikes were, to him, an unqualified success. But as the chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said on Sunday morning, assessing the damage to the sites will take some time. A preliminary assessment from the Defense Intelligence Agency found that the strikes had failed to destroy some core components of the nuclear program, CNN reported today.
问题在于，停火与与伊朗有关其核计划的未来的外交协议无关。特朗普显然认为不需要进一步的谈判，因为对他来说，军事罢工是不合格的成功。但是，正如参谋长联席会议主席在周日上午说，评估对网站的损害将需要一些时间。美国有线电视新闻网今天报道说，国防情报局的初步评估发现，罢工未能破坏核计划的某些核心组成部分。
Read: The true impact of Trump’s strike on Iran
阅读：特朗普对伊朗的罢工的真正影响
If parts of the program survived, or if Iran stockpiled and hid enriched uranium in advance of the strikes, then Tehran’s next steps seem clear. It will end cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency and withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Without eyes and ears on the ground, the international community will lose the ability to monitor Iran’s program. Iran could then choose to build a bomb covertly.
如果该计划的某些部分幸存下来，或者伊朗在罢工之前储存并隐藏了浓缩铀，那么德黑兰的下一步就很清楚了。它将结束与国际原子能局的合作，并退出《核不扩散条约》。国际社会将没有地面上的眼睛和耳朵，将失去监视伊朗计划的能力。然后，伊朗可以选择秘密地制造炸弹。
There is a worrisome parallel here to North Korea, which ended cooperation with the IAEA, pulled out of the NPT, and slowly resumed production of highly enriched uranium. A few years later, Pyongyang tested a nuclear device, much to everyone’s surprise.
这里有一个与朝鲜相似的令人担忧的人，该朝鲜与IAEA结束了合作，从NPT中退出，并慢慢恢复了高度富集的铀。几年后，平壤测试了一种核装置，这让每个人都感到惊讶。
The Iranian regime may conclude that withdrawing from the NPT is its most effective form of retaliation. At the start of the Trump administration, the Islamic Republic was in its weakest position since coming to power in 1979, because of its own catastrophic choices. On October 8, 2023—the day after Hamas attacked Israel—Hezbollah, Iran’s proxy force in Lebanon, joined the war against Israel at a low level. Within a year, Israel had decimated the Lebanese militia. Since then, Israel has significantly weakened Hamas, and another Iranian ally, Syria’s leader, Bashar al-Assad, was toppled by local militias. Iran launched two massive air attacks on Israel in 2024—in April and October—with the clear intent of killing hundreds, if not thousands, of Israelis. The United States led a regional coalition to shoot down practically all of Iran’s missiles, and Israeli counterstrikes destroyed much of Iran’s air defenses.
伊朗政权可能会得出结论，从NPT退出是其最有效的报复形式。在特朗普政府开始时，由于其自身的灾难性选择，伊斯兰共和国自1979年上台以来处于最弱状态。2023年10月8日，哈马斯袭击以色列的第二天，伊朗在黎巴嫩的代理部队赫兹布拉（Hezbollah）加入了对以色列的战争。一年之内，以色列摧毁了黎巴嫩民兵。从那以后，以色列大大削弱了哈马斯，另一个伊朗盟友巴沙尔·阿萨德（Bashar al-Assad）被当地民兵推翻。伊朗在2024年（4月和10月）对以色列发动了两次大规模空袭，并明确打算杀死以色列人数百人（即使不是数千人）。美国领导了一个地区联盟，几乎击落了伊朗的所有导弹，以色列反击摧毁了伊朗的大部分防空措施。
Tehran has been left with no good options for retaliating against the Israeli and American strikes that just took place. If it seeks to kill large numbers of Americans, either in assaults on U.S. bases or by carrying out a terrorist attack in the United States, it will risk enraging Trump and drawing the U.S. into a prolonged conflict that could threaten the regime. Iran could try to close the Strait of Hormuz, but sustaining that would be difficult given Tehran’s shortage of missile launchers and vessels, and the likelihood of a significant international response. And if it expands the war to Saudi Arabia, Iran will just be bringing more enemies into the fray.
德黑兰对对以色列和刚刚发生的美国罢工进行报复没有很好的选择。如果它试图杀死大量美国人，无论是在美国基地袭击还是通过在美国进行恐怖袭击，它将风险愤怒并吸引美国陷入可能威胁该政权的长期冲突。伊朗可能会试图关闭霍尔木兹的海峡，但是鉴于德黑兰缺乏导弹发射器和船只，以及对国际大量反应的可能性，这将是很困难的。如果将战争扩展到沙特阿拉伯，伊朗将把更多的敌人带入竞争。
Hunkering down, buying time, and perhaps building a nuclear weapon is a much more viable option by comparison.
相比之下，闲逛，购买时间甚至建造核武器是一个更可行的选择。
Tom Nichols: The United States bombed Iran. What comes next?
汤姆·尼科尔斯（Tom Nichols）：美国轰炸了伊朗。接下来是什么？
So long as Iran is a member of the NPT, it has a commitment to allow the IAEA access to its nuclear sites for inspections and a framework under which to accept strict limits on its uranium-enrichment program. If it withdraws, none of that will be enforceable. A robust diplomatic deal was preferable to a military strike because it would have provided a verifiable way of permanently preventing Iran from developing a nuclear weapon rather than a temporary reprieve.
只要伊朗是《不致力国外》的成员，它就会承诺允许国际原子能机构进入其核场地进行检查和一个框架，并根据其铀增强计划受到严格限制。如果撤回，则不能强制执行。一项强大的外交协议比军事罢工更可取，因为它将提供一种可靠的方式，即永久防止伊朗开发核武器而不是临时缓刑。
Iran’s weak position before the air assault gave the United States enormous diplomatic leverage, and Trump had been pursuing such a deal. Exactly why that fell apart isn’t known. Perhaps Israel acted militarily because it feared that a U.S.-Iran deal wouldn’t fully dismantle Iran’s nuclear program, or perhaps new intelligence about Iran’s program came to light.
伊朗在空中袭击之前的弱势地位给美国带来了巨大的外交杠杆作用，特朗普一直在达成这样的交易。确切地说，为什么不知道。也许以色列的行动是军事行动，因为它担心美国 - 伊朗的交易不会完全拆除伊朗的核计划，或者也许关于伊朗计划的新情报已经曝光。
Regardless of the reason, once Israel acted, Trump was in a tough position. If he didn’t follow suit, Iran’s deeply buried Fordo facility could survive largely intact, and Iran might make a dash for the bomb. If he did act, the United States could get dragged into a protracted war without a clearly defined end goal.
不管原因是什么，一旦以色列采取行动，特朗普就处于艰难的位置。如果他不效仿，伊朗被深深埋葬的福尔多设施将在很大程度上完好无损，伊朗可能会为炸弹造成破折号。如果他确实采取了行动，那么如果没有明确定义的最终目标，美国就可以陷入旷日持久的战争中。
Trump sought to address these dangers by ordering precise strikes on Fordo, Natanz, and Isfahan and then almost immediately leaning on Israel to accept a cease-fire so that the United States would not get drawn into a forever war. But the primary risk of the military option remains: If it was not completely successful, Iran could withdraw from the NPT and make the decision to build nuclear weapons.
特朗普试图通过命令对福多，纳坦兹和伊斯法罕的精确打击来解决这些危险，然后几乎立即依靠以色列接受停火，以使美国不会被永远陷入永远的战争。但是，军事选择的主要风险仍然存在：如果它不是完全成功的话，伊朗可以退出不应该存，并决定建造核武器。
Trump could have managed that risk by telling the public that although the strikes appeared to have been successful, fully ascertaining their results would take time. He could then have insisted on a week-long cease-fire for the purpose of concluding a diplomatic agreement with Iran—one that would have insisted on limits to Iran’s nuclear program and continued access for the IAEA, whose inspectors remain in Iran but have not been admitted into nuclear sites. Given the likely damage done to the program, he could have afforded to stop short of demanding full dismantlement and settled instead for strict limits on enrichment, as well as round-the-clock inspections with no expiration date.
特朗普本可以通过告诉公众的风险，尽管罢工似乎取得了成功，但充分确定其结果将需要时间。然后，他可以坚持要与伊朗达成外交协议，为期一周的停火，这将坚持对伊朗核计划的限制，并继续访问IAEA，IAEA的检查员仍留在伊朗，但未被录取核场。鉴于可能对该计划造成的损害，他本可以承受不需要完全拆除的要求，而是为了严格限制富集而解决，并且在没有到期日期的情况下进行了全天候检查。
But Trump took a very different path by declaring the problem fully solved and not using the moment of leverage to extract commitments from Tehran.
但是，特朗普通过宣布该问题得到了充分解决，而不是利用杠杆时刻来提取德黑兰的承诺，从而采取了截然不同的道路。
Read: Trump’s two-week window for diplomacy was a smoke screen
阅读：特朗普为期两周的外交窗口是烟幕
Tensions between Washington and Jerusalem seem all but inevitable in the aftermath of this choice. Trump has made abundantly clear that he expects only one answer from the U.S. intelligence agencies now poring over the evidence to assess the extent of damage to Iran’s nuclear program. Congressional intelligence committees may need to step up to get at the truth. Israel, meanwhile, has a pressing interest in finding out whether or not the strikes succeeded. If they didn’t, and Iran is able to rebuild its program within a year or two, the Israeli government will presumably want to deal with that and not pretend that the strikes ended the threat for good.
在选择后，华盛顿和耶路撒冷之间的紧张局势似乎几乎是不可避免的。特朗普已经大量明确表示，他期望美国情报机构只有一个答案，如今正在遵守证据，以评估伊朗核计划的损害程度。国会情报委员会可能需要加紧努力才能了解真相。同时，以色列对找出罢工是否成功的兴趣很大。如果他们不这样做，并且伊朗能够在一两年内重建计划，那么以色列政府可能会想处理这一计划，而不是假装罢工使威胁永久结束。
Trump does have one means at his disposal for tacking back to diplomacy without fully reversing his position. The Obama-era nuclear deal had a provision, called “snapback,” that allowed its signatories to reimpose United Nations Security Council sanctions on Iran without a Russian or Chinese veto should Tehran be found acting in violation of the agreement’s constraints. The United States withdrew from that agreement in 2018, so it can’t activate snapback—but France, Germany, and Britain are still signatories, and they have until October to make use of the clause.
特朗普确实有一种手段，因为他在不完全扭转自己的立场的情况下重新恢复外交。奥巴马时代的核协议有一项称为“快速返还”的规定，该规定允许其签署人在没有俄罗斯或中国否决权的情况下对联合国安理会对伊朗进行制裁，如果发现德黑兰违反了协议的限制。美国在2018年退出了该协议，因此无法激活Snapback，但法国，德国和英国仍然是签署者，直到10月才能使用该条款。
The United States could continue to insist that Iran’s nuclear program was completely destroyed and is no longer operable. This would make snapback more difficult to activate. But if Trump still wants a diplomatic deal, he can work with the Europeans to present Iran with a clear choice: If it agrees to inspections and strict limits on its program, it can have sanctions relief. If it doesn’t, snapback will take effect. This may not be enough to persuade Iran to stay in the NPT. But without it or something like it, Trump may find himself confronted with a new Iranian nuclear crisis later in his term.
美国可能会继续坚持认为伊朗的核计划已被彻底摧毁，不再可行。这将使快速back更难激活。但是，如果特朗普仍然想要一项外交协议，他可以与欧洲人合作，为伊朗提供明确的选择：如果它同意检查并严格对其计划的限制，那么它可能会救济。如果没有，Snapback将生效。这可能不足以说服伊朗留在NPT。但是，如果没有它或类似的东西，特朗普可能会发现自己在任期后期遇到了新的伊朗核危机。
