“NOW IS THE TIME FOR PEACE!” Donald Trump posted on Truth Social right after the United States launched a bombing campaign against three sites crucial to the Iranian nuclear program.
“现在是和平的时候了！”唐纳德·特朗普（Donald Trump）在美国发起了针对三个对伊朗核计划至关重要的地点的轰炸运动之后，发布了真相社会。
But Iran gets a vote on whether that time has indeed come, and its leaders are instead vowing “everlasting consequences.” What happens next in this rapidly expanding war largely depends on what exactly Iran means by that.
但是伊朗对这段时间是否确实来了，而其领导人则誓言“永恒的后果”。在这场迅速扩张的战争中接下来会发生什么在很大程度上取决于伊朗的意思。
That’s not easy to predict, because the next stage of the conflict now hinges on an Iran facing unprecedented circumstances. The Iranian regime is arguably more enfeebled and imperiled than it has been since the 1979 revolution ushered the Islamic Republic into existence. Even before Israel launched its sweeping military campaign against Iranian nuclear and military targets just over a week ago, it had dramatically degraded two of the three pillars of Iran’s defenses: Tehran’s regional network of proxy groups (such as Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon) and its conventional military arsenal (assets like missiles, drones, and air defenses). Now Israel and the United States may have reduced the third pillar—the country’s nuclear program and its position at the threshold of acquiring nuclear weapons—to smoldering ruins as well.
这并不容易预测，因为现在冲突的下一阶段取决于面临前所未有的情况的伊朗。自1979年革命以来，伊朗政权比以前更加笼罩和危险。Even before Israel launched its sweeping military campaign against Iranian nuclear and military targets just over a week ago, it had dramatically degraded two of the three pillars of Iran’s defenses: Tehran’s regional network of proxy groups (such as Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon) and its conventional military arsenal (assets like missiles, drones, and air defenses).现在，以色列和美国可能已经减少了第三个支柱，即该国的核计划及其在获取核武器的门槛上也减少了闷闷不乐的废墟。
Read: ‘Everybody knows Khamenei’s days are numbered’
阅读：“每个人都知道Khamenei的日子已经编号”
Given these conditions, past behavior by the Iranian regime may not be a reliable indicator of its future actions. Iran’s leaders, for example, have developed a reputation for biding their time for months or even years before retaliating against foes, but the speed and scale at which their nuclear program and the regime itself are coming under threat may force their hand.
鉴于这些条件，伊朗政权的过去行为可能不是其未来行动的可靠指标。例如，伊朗的领导人在报复敌人之前几个月甚至几年就赢得了声誉，但其核计划和政权本身受到威胁的速度和规模可能会迫使他们的手。
For Iran experts, the north-star assumption tends to be that the regime’s overriding priority is ensuring its survival. Viewed through that prism, the Iranian government currently lives in the land of bad options. If Iran responds forcefully to the United States, it could enter an escalatory cycle with the world’s leading military power and an archenemy already pummeling it, which in turn could endanger the regime. If Tehran responds in a limited manner or not at all, it could look weak in ways that could also endanger the regime from within (enraged hard-liners) or without (emboldened enemies).
对于伊朗专家而言，北极星的假设往往是该政权的优先权正在确保其生存。通过这种棱镜，伊朗政府目前居住在不良选择的土地上。如果伊朗对美国做出有力的反应，它可能会与世界领先的军事力量一起进入升级的周期，而这已经使它陷入困境，这反过来又可能危害政权。如果德黑兰以有限的方式做出反应，或者根本没有反应，它可能以可能从内部或没有（胆小的敌人）内部危害政权的方式看起来很虚弱。
“There are no good options, but Iran still has options,” Sanam Vakil, an expert on Iran and the broader region at the think tank Chatham House, told me. She ticked off the goals of any Iranian retaliation: “Inflict pain. Transfer the costs of the war outside of Iran. Showcase resilience, survivability.”
“没有好的选择，但伊朗仍然有选择，”伊朗和智囊团查塔姆之家的更广泛地区的专家萨南·瓦基尔（Sanam Vakil）告诉我。她打开了任何伊朗报复的目标：“痛苦。将战争的成本转移到伊朗之外。展示弹性，生存能力。”
In my conversations with experts, five potential Iranian moves kept surfacing.
在与专家的对话中，五项潜在的伊朗举动不断浮出水面。
1. Close the Strait of Hormuz
1。关闭Hormuz的海峡
Iran could take a big step and use its military to disrupt shipping or even seek to shut down commerce in the Strait of Hormuz, a crowded international waterway near southern Iran through which roughly one-fifth of the world’s oil supply passes.
伊朗可以迈出一大步，利用其军队破坏运输，甚至试图关闭伊朗南部一条拥挤的国际水路海峡的商业，这大约五分之一的石油供应通行证。
Indeed, in the hours after the U.S. strikes, the Iranian Parliament reportedly granted its support for such a measure, though Iran’s leadership hasn’t yet followed through with action along these lines.
确实，在美国罢工后的几个小时里，据报道，伊朗议会对这项措施表示了支持，尽管伊朗的领导层尚未遵循这些行动。
Such a move would affect the global economy, driving down financial markets, driving up the price of oil, and inflicting steep costs on economies around the world. It would likely get the attention of the economic-minded American president.
这样的举动将影响全球经济，推动金融市场，推动石油价格，并为全球经济带来巨大的成本。这可能会引起经济有意识的美国总统的注意。
But in addition to the fact that the U.S. military might contest such a move, the dispersed pain of this measure could ultimately make it an unattractive option for Iran. The economic shock would boomerang back to Iran, in addition to harming Iran’s patron, oil-importing China, as well as oil-exporting Gulf Arab states. In recent years, Iran has been improving its relations with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates—the Saudis even restored diplomatic ties with the Iranians in 2023. The Iranian regime will likely be wary of alienating partners at a time when it is so isolated and diminished.
但是，除了美国军方可能对这样的举动提出这一举动之外，这项措施的痛苦最终可能使其成为伊朗没有吸引力的选择。除了伤害伊朗的赞助人，石油进口的中国以及石油爆发的阿拉伯国家外，经济冲击还将回到伊朗。近年来，伊朗一直在改善其与沙特阿拉伯和阿拉伯联合酋长国的关系 - 沙特人甚至在2023年恢复了与伊朗人的外交联系。伊朗政权可能会在如此孤立和减少的时候对疏远合作伙伴保持警惕。
2. Attack U.S. personnel or interests in the Middle East
2。攻击美国人员或中东的利益
Iran could also choose, either directly or through what remains of its regional proxy groups, to attack U.S. forces, bases, or other interests in the region.
伊朗还可以直接或通过其区域代理团体的剩余部分来攻击该地区的美国部队，基地或其他利益。
That could include attacks on U.S. personnel or energy-related infrastructure based in Gulf countries allied with the United States, with the latter option serving as another way to induce economic shock. But Tehran’s assessment here may be similar to its calculations regarding the Strait of Hormuz. If the Iranians hit targets in the Gulf, that could “bite the hand that feeds” Iran, Vakil told me. “They need the Gulf to play a de-escalation role and perhaps a broader regional stabilization role. I think they will try to protect their relationship with the Gulf at all costs.”
这可能包括在与美国结盟的海湾国家对美国人员或能源相关的基础设施的攻击，后者的选择是引起经济冲击的另一种方式。但是德黑兰在这里的评估可能类似于其关于Hormuz海峡的计算。瓦基尔告诉我，如果伊朗人在海湾中遇到了目标，那可以“咬伊朗的手”，瓦基尔告诉我。“他们需要海湾发挥降级作用，也许是更广泛的区域稳定角色。我认为他们将不惜一切代价保护自己与海湾的关系。”
Vakil deemed it more probable that Iran would strike U.S. targets in nearby countries that don’t have close relations with Tehran, such as Iraq, Syria, and Bahrain, which hosts the headquarters of U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT).
瓦基尔（Vakil）认为，伊朗将在附近的国家袭击美国与德黑兰（例如伊拉克，叙利亚和巴林）没有密切关系的国家的目标，后者主持了美国海军中央司令部总部（Nevent）的总部。
If Iran were to take this approach, much would depend on whether its strikes are relatively restrained—essentially designed to claim that it has avenged the U.S. attack without provoking a major response from Washington—or whether it decides to go bigger, perhaps galvanized by the devastation wrought by the U.S. attacks and the U.S. government’s sharp public messaging.
如果伊朗要采用这种方法，很大程度上取决于其罢工是否相对限制，本质上是为了声称它在没有引起华盛顿的重大反应的情况下报仇，或者它是否决定更大，也许会因美国政府攻击和美国政府迅速公开消息而造成的毁灭性。
Read: Trump changed. The intelligence didn’t.
阅读：特朗普改变了。情报没有。
“If the Iranians really strike all of the NAVCENT base in Bahrain,” Jonathan Panikoff, a former U.S. deputy national-intelligence officer for the Near East who is now my colleague at the Atlantic Council, told me, they may “open up a world of hurt.” Such an attack might embarrass Trump and spur him to make good on his threat in his address to the nation on Saturday evening to respond to Iran with even greater force. The United States could, for example, hit Iranian oil and gas facilities or other energy sites, army and navy targets, or even political and military leaders. The war in Iran could quickly metastasize into a regional conflict.
“如果伊朗人确实在巴林袭击了所有陆上的陆基基地，”乔纳森·帕尼科夫（Jonathan Panikoff）是美国近东副国家副官员官员，他现在是我的大西洋委员会的同事，他们告诉我，他们可能“打开一个受伤的世界”。这样的攻击可能使特朗普感到尴尬，并激励他在周六晚上对国家的讲话中对自己的威胁做好良好的态度，以更大的力量对伊朗作出回应。例如，美国可以袭击伊朗石油和天然气设施或其他能源场所，陆军和海军目标，甚至是政治和军事领导人。伊朗的战争可以迅速转移到区域冲突中。
Consider, as one case study, what transpired after the United States killed the Iranian general Qassem Soleimani during the first Trump administration in 2020. Analysts predicted all sorts of potential Iranian retaliatory measures of various sizes and scales, but Iran ultimately opted for an intense but circumscribed missile attack on the Al-Asad Airbase in Iraq, resulting in no fatalities but more than 100 U.S. personnel with traumatic brain injuries. The Trump administration downplayed the attack and limited its response to imposing more economic sanctions on Iran, and the two countries even swapped messages via the Swiss embassy in Tehran to defuse tensions.
Consider, as one case study, what transpired after the United States killed the Iranian general Qassem Soleimani during the first Trump administration in 2020. Analysts predicted all sorts of potential Iranian retaliatory measures of various sizes and scales, but Iran ultimately opted for an intense but circumscribed missile attack on the Al-Asad Airbase in Iraq, resulting in no fatalities but more than 100 U.S. personnel with traumatic brain受伤。特朗普政府轻描淡写了这次袭击，并将其反应限制在对伊朗实施更多经济制裁的反应中，两国甚至通过瑞士大使馆在德黑兰交换了信息，以减轻紧张局势。
3. Attack U.S. personnel or interests beyond the Middle East
3。攻击美国人员或中东以外的利益
An even more escalatory approach would be for Iran to directly attack U.S. targets beyond the region, Panikoff noted, referencing countries such as Turkey, Pakistan, and Central Asian nations.
Panikoff指出，伊朗将直接攻击该地区以外的美国目标的一种更加升级的方法是指参考土耳其，巴基斯坦和中亚国家等国家。
But he thinks such a move is “very unlikely” because the Iranians would be taking a “hugely retaliatory” step and inviting conflict with those countries. “Having an actual missile attack—say, into Pakistan against the U.S. embassy—would be devastating and shocking,” Panikoff told me, adding that he could envision Iranian leaders doing this only if they believed that the end of their regime was near and they had “nothing to lose.”
但是他认为这样的举动“不太可能”，因为伊朗人将采取“严重报复”的步骤，并诱使与这些国家的冲突。帕尼科夫告诉我：“发生实际的导弹袭击 - （例如，进入巴基斯坦对阵美国大使馆）将是毁灭性和令人震惊的。”
Alternatively, the Iranians could revert to more rudimentary, older-school practices of theirs such as directly executing terrorist attacks or sponsoring proxy-group terrorist attacks against U.S., Israeli, or Jewish targets around the world. That “would be a lower bar” for the Iranians, Panikoff said, and “is something to be worried about.”
另外，伊朗人可以恢复其更基本的老年人实践，例如直接执行恐怖袭击或赞助代理团体恐怖袭击美国，以色列或世界各地的犹太人目标。潘尼科夫说，对于伊朗人来说，“这将是一个较低的酒吧”，“是要担心的东西。”
4. Dash toward a nuclear weapon
4。冲向核武器
The Iranian regime could draw the lesson from its escalating war with Israel and the United States that only possession of a nuclear weapon can save it. Even before Israel’s military operation, Iran seemed to be tentatively moving in the direction of trading its position on the brink of nuclear-weapons power for actual nuclear weapons, which appears to have contributed to the timing of Israel’s campaign.
伊朗政权可以从与以色列和美国的升级战争中汲取教训，即只有核武器才能挽救它。甚至在以色列的军事行动之前，伊朗似乎都在朝着将其在核武器权力的边缘换成实际核武器的边缘的方向，这似乎促成了以色列竞选活动的时机。
But although prior to the war Iran may have been capable of enriching uranium to 90 percent, or weapons-grade, within days or weeks, it was further away—perhaps months or more—from the capability of turning that weapons-grade uranium into a usable nuclear weapon. And now its nuclear program has been seriously degraded, though the extent of the damage isn’t yet entirely clear: Iran may have retained its stockpile of enriched uranium. Any push for the bomb could also invite further economic sanctions and military operations against Iran. That makes a race for a nuclear bomb in the immediate aftermath of the U.S. strikes, with whatever resources it has left, unlikely, although Iran could take steps short of that such as seeking to develop and possibly use a crude nuclear device, scrambling to rebuild its nuclear program, or withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
但是，尽管伊朗在战争之前，伊朗可能已经能够将铀富集到几天或几周之内（也许几个月或更长时间），从将武器级的铀变成可用的核武器。现在，它的核计划已经严重退化，尽管损害的程度尚不清楚：伊朗可能保留了其富集的铀的库存。任何推动炸弹的推动还可以诱使对伊朗的进一步经济制裁和军事行动。这使得在美国罢工之后立即进行核弹比赛，但不太可能剩下的任何资源，尽管伊朗可能会采取任何措施，例如寻求开发并可能使用粗糙的核装置，争先恐后地重建其核计划，或者撤回其核计划。
Iran will emerge from this war with dead nuclear scientists and destroyed physical nuclear infrastructure, but what will persist in some form is the technical expertise that enabled it to enrich uranium to 60 percent, and that probably can be applied to further enriching the material to weapons-grade, because that isn’t much of an additional leap. The longer-term threat of a nuclear Iran is unlikely to be wiped out as long as the current Iranian regime, or any like-minded or even harder-line one, remains in power.
伊朗将与死去的核科学家一起爆发这场战争，并破坏了物理核基础设施，但是以某种形式持续存在的是使其能够使其富集到60％的技术专长，并且可能可以将材料进一步富集到武器级上，因为这并不是一个额外的飞跃。只要目前的伊朗政权，或任何志趣相投甚至更艰难的一人，核伊朗的长期威胁就不可能被消灭。
5. Strike a nuclear deal with the United States
5。与美国达成核协议
It may seem like the most improbable scenario, given the bellicosity of Iranian rhetoric, but another potential outcome is that Iran concludes that the regime will be existentially threatened by an escalatory spiral with a militarily superior Israel and the United States and that, beyond a muted response, its next move should be striking a new nuclear deal with the United States that results in the end of the war and the regime in Tehran still in place.
考虑到伊朗言论的好评，这似乎是最不可能的情况，但另一个潜在的结果是，伊朗的结论是，该政权将受到与以色列和美国的军事上级螺旋式上的升级螺旋形式的威胁，而且除了下一步的努力，其下一步的反应还应与新的核电行为相关。
Read: The only Iran hawk is Trump
阅读：唯一的伊朗鹰是特朗普
But this would require Iran to agree to U.S. conditions that it forswear any nuclear enrichment, to which Iran hasn’t given any indication of being amenable. So for the moment, this outcome appears unlikely as well.
但这将要求伊朗同意美国条件，即它放弃了任何核丰富，伊朗没有任何迹象表明。因此，目前，这种结果似乎也不太可能。
Iran may want to carefully calibrate its response to the U.S. strikes, but calibration in volatile conflicts isn’t always possible.
伊朗可能希望仔细校准其对美国罢工的反应，但是在挥发性冲突中进行的校准并不总是可能的。
The Iranian attack on U.S. forces in Iraq after Soleimani’s killing five years ago may have been smaller than some anticipated, but it has still been described as “the largest ballistic-missile attack against Americans ever.” Troops later recounted that one soldier in a shelter behind the base’s blast walls was nearly blown up by the barrage. Frank McKenzie, then the commander of U.S. Central Command, has estimated that had he not ordered a partial evacuation of the airbase, an additional 100 to 150 Americans might have been wounded or killed.
五年前索莱马尼杀死后，伊朗对伊拉克美军的袭击可能比预期的要小，但仍然被描述为“对美国人有史以来最大的弹道弹式袭击”。后来，部队说，弹幕几乎炸毁了基地爆炸墙后面的一个庇护所的一名士兵。当时的美国中央指挥官弗兰克·麦肯齐（Frank McKenzie）估计，如果他不下令部分撤离空军基地，则可能会受伤或杀害100至150名美国人。
If that had happened, the Trump administration might have responded much more forcefully, which in turn could have sparked further escalation from Iran. The effort to achieve a calibrated response might have produced a full-blown war. All actors in this current war now contemplating their next moves should keep that lesson in mind.
如果发生这种情况，特朗普政府可能会做出更大的反应，这反过来又可能引发伊朗的进一步升级。实现校准响应的努力可能会产生一场全面的战争。现在，当前战争中的所有演员都在考虑下一步的举动。
